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BETWEEN THE BUTTONS: EMPLOYER DISTRIBUTION
OF ANTIUNION INSIGNIA
JOHN W. TEETER, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Campaign buttons are a commonplace in American political life. People
wear insignia to promote their political allegiances and signify their unity
with like-minded spirits. The same is true in labor representation cam-
paigns, where employees commonly use insignia to express their beliefs
as to whether the workplace should become unionized.'
Numerous cases hold that the National Labor Relations Act 2 (the "Act")
protects the right of workers to wear prounion insignia without facing
retaliation from their employers.3 The National Labor Relations Board
(the "Board") and courts have recognized exceptions to this rule,4 but
employees are usually free to wear union campaign emblems.,
* Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law. University of Illinois at Chicago Circle,
A.B. 1982; Harvard Law School, J.D. 1985. This article would not have been possible without the
support of Cheryl Michiko Kuwada. My colleague Jon C. Dubin also provided invaluable advice
and encouragement. I also would like to thank St. Mary's University for its generous research grant
and Camille Higgins, David Jones, K.Y. Takamine, and Chris Pittard for their research assistance.
i. For provocative discussions of labor representation elections, see ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, NLRB
REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT (rev. ed. 1985); Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace:
Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REv. 495 (1993); Derek C.
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under the National Labor
Relations Act, 78 HAiv. L. REV. 38 (1964); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
Rights to Self-Organization under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
2. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
3. The landmark decision in this field is Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793
(1945), where the Supreme Court ruled that the employer had violated the Act by discharging three
workers for wearing union steward buttons. The reasoning behind Republic Aviation and its progeny
is straightforward: Section 7 of the Act provides, in relevant part, that "[e]mployees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157. For this reason, an
employer's interference with a worker's wearing of prounion insignia is often found to violate
Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, which provides that it is an unfair labor practice "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed [in Section 71." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1). Furthermore, Section 8(a)(3) provides, in relevant part, that it is an unfair labor practice
for employers "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3).
4. As the administrative law judge explained in Albertson's, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 1013, 1016
(1990), employers may forbid workers from wearing prounion insignia when "necessary to maintain
production and discipline, diffuse employee dissension, insure employee safety, protect machinery
and products from damage, assist employee concentration, or project a certain image to the public."
(citations omitted). For an argument that this litany of limitations is unjustified, see John W.
Teeter, Jr., Banning the Buttons: Employer Interference with the Right to Wear Union Insignia in
the Workplace, 80 Ky. L.J. 377 (1991-92).
5. For example, employers prohibiting prounion insignia were found guilty of violating the Act
in Sirangelo, 298 N.L.R.B. 924 (1990); Keystone Lamp Mfg. Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 626 (1987); and
Page Avjet Corp., 275 N.L.R.B. 773 (1985).
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As a matter of law and principle, workers should also be free to wear
antiunion emblems or to wear no insignia at all. Section 7 of the Act
encompasses both the right to support unions and the right not to support
unions, 6 so workers should be entitled to wear campaign insignia regardless
of whether it supports or decries unionization. In this manner, workers
can openly proclaim their beliefs and seek to influence their peers.
A different issue arises, however, when an employer distributes anti-
union insignia to its work force. At this point, the wearing of antiunion
emblems may no longer represent the employees' free and unilateral
expression of their sentiments. Instead, the employer's intrusion raises
the specter of possible coercion. Such coercion-explicit or implied-can
occur in at least two ways. First, workers may sense that they are being
pressured to wear a "loyalty badge" for the employer and that if they
refuse to do so they will be branded as union zealots. As discussed
below, many workers may fear employer retaliation under these circum-
stances. 7 Second, as a consequence of this concern, workers may decide
to wear the antiunion insignia even though it contradicts their actual
beliefs. This obviously could undermine a worker's self-esteem, offend
our commitment to industrial democracy, and permit the employer to
paint a misleading picture of support for its antiunion position.
The Board has recognized such problems, but wavered in its response.
Far from yielding a clear and consistent resolution, the cases reveal three
conflicting lines of authority. The first line, which may be termed the
"prohibitory" school, is quick to find coercion when an employer dis-
tributes antiunion emblems. In these cases, the Board either finds the
employer guilty of an unfair labor practice or orders a new election to
give workers another opportunity to vote for the union.8
6. As Justice Douglas explained:
Any procedure requiring a "fair" election must honor the rights of those who
oppose a union as well as those who favor it. The Act is wholly neutral when it
comes to that basic choice. By § 7 of the Act employees have the right not only
to "form, join, or assist" unions but also the right "to refrain from any or all
of such activities."
N.L.R.B. v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 278 (1973) (quoting § 7 of the Act).
7. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
8. The unfair labor practice charge would be grounded in Section 8(a)(l) of the Act which
enjoins employers not "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the workers' organizational
activity. 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(l). Once a Section 8(a)(1) violation is found, the Board typically vacates
the election results and orders a new round of balloting. As the Board explained in Dal-Tex Optical
Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786 (1962), "[clonduct violative of Section 8(a)(l) is, a fortiori, conduct
which interferes with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an election." The Board
abandons this approach only "in cases where it is virtually impossible to conclude that the misconduct
could have affected the election results." Clark Equip. Co., 278 N.L.R.B. 498, 505 (1986).
The Board also may invalidate an election even when the employer's conduct does not constitute
an unfair labor practice:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in
which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible,
to determine the uninhibited desires of employees. It is our duty to determine
whether they have been fulfilled. When, in the rare extreme case, the standard
drops too low, because of our fault or that of others, the requisite laboratory
conditions are not present and the experiment must be conducted over again.
General Shoes Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
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The second line of cases, the "permissive" school, gives employers
broad latitude to distribute antiunion emblems. In these cases the Board
is loath to find implied coercion and commonly belittles what may amount
to express interference with workers' Section 7 rights. The conflict between
the prohibitory and permissive schools is obvious, but the Board has
done little to resolve this tension.
Third is the "moderate" school, in which the Board permits employers
to distribute antiunion insignia under certain conditions. For example,
an employer may make antiunion emblems "available" at the workplace,
but may not distribute them to employees on an individual basis or
record which workers accept or reject them. This school seeks to remove
the prophylactic restrictions of the prohibitory cases while avoiding the
dangers inherent in the permissive line of authority.
These competing lines of authority create needless confusion and offer
inadequate protection of the workers' Section 7 rights. After examining
cases reflecting each school of thought, I conclude that the Board should
consistently maintain a strict prohibition on employer distribution of
antiunion insignia. As explained below, 9 this prohibition would neither
interfere with an employer's rights under Section 8(c)10 nor preclude
antiunion employees from waging an effective campaign. To the contrary,
a strict prohibition simply would prevent employers from pressuring
workers into either wearing emblems that contradict their beliefs or
revealing their stance in the campaign through their acceptance or rejection
of their employer's proffered insignia.
II. THE PROHIBITORY SCHOOL
The origins of the Board's prohibitory school may be found in its
1944 decision in Agar Packing & Provision Corp." Shortly before the
election, the employer asked its workers to replace their prounion caps
with ones stating "Victory-100% American-Buy Bonds."'" The Board
found the employer's conduct unlawful, reasoning that it was:
designed to remove from the scene on the eve of an election a very
conspicuous union insignia (the union cap) and to identify the res-
pondent's opposition to the Union with 100 percent Americanism.
The respondent's conduct in requesting the employees, a day before
9. See infra Part V.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if
such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
For in-depth discussions of Section 8(c), see Herbert Burstein, Free Speech for Employers, I LAB.
L.J. 425 (1950); Thomas G.S. Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda and the National Labor Relations
Act, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 243 (1963); Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, 61 H.jtv. L. REV. I, 15-20 (1947); Robert F. Koretz, Employer Interference
with Union Organization Versus Employer Free Speech, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 399 (1960).
11. 58 N.L.R.B. 738 (1944).
12. Id. at 742.
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the election, to replace the union cap with its own, thereby inducing
them to engage in an anti-union demonstration during working hours,
was an ill-disguised form of coercion and interference proscribed by
Section 8(1) [now 8(a)(l)] of the Act.' 3
Agar exemplifies both the virtue and the weakness of the Board's
prohibitory approach. The Board reached a defensible result, for surely
it is troublesome when an employer "requests" its workers to replace
union emblems with antiunion materials. The Board's reasoning was
incomplete, however, because it failed to explain precisely why the em-
ployer's conduct was coercive. Did the employees fear retaliation if they
refused their employer's directive? Or, as a prophylactic matter, is it
simply prudent to prohibit employers from even offering such insignia?
When, if ever, should such distribution be permitted? These questions
have yet to receive a thoughtful and consistent response.
The Board's 1945 opinion in Thompson Products4 also condemned an
employer's distribution of antiunion emblems. Here the employer was
held to have interfered with the election by circulating hats with various
proemployer slogans.' 5 The Board tersely concluded that the employer
"intended to and did bring pressure to bear on its employees publicly
to declare themselves for or against the unions on the ballot.' ' 6
Despite their paucity of analysis, Agar and Thompson suggest the twin
perils of employer distribution of antiunion insignia-the peril of com-
pelled campaigning for management and the peril of coercive interrogation.
As Agar indicated, it is offensive to coerce workers into demonstrating
support for a campaign position that may contradict their true beliefs.
Furthermore, Thompson suggests that distributing antiunion materials can
be used to reveal the workers' union sympathies. Those who refuse to
wear antiunion emblems may be identified as union advocates, whereas
those who wear them may do so not out of proemployer sentiment but
because they fear their employer.' 7 In either instance, these are precisely
13. Id. (footnote omitted).
14. 60 N.L.R.B. 1381 (1945).
15. Id. at 1385.
16. Id. (footnote omitted); see also G & S Mfg., Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 1602, 1608-10 (1959)(holding that employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by soliciting employees to wear "I am non-union"
labels).
17. The fear of an employer is hardly unwarranted. Given the scores of American workers whohave been unlawfully discharged or otherwise disciplined for wearing prounion insignia, see Teeter,
supra note 4, there is valid concern that employees could also face unlawful retaliation for refusing
to wear antiunion insignia. More generally, much has been written concerning employers' unlawful
actions against union supporters and the inadequacy of the Board's current remedies to deter such
misbehavior. Paul Weiler asserts that "the skyrocketing use of coercive and illegal tactics" by
employers has been a "major factor" in the decline of American unions and that "[tihe current
system of unfair labor practice remedies has proven powerless to contain such intimidation or to
undo its effects." Weiler, supra note 1, at 1769-70. The extent of such employer lawlessness andits actual impact on unionization have been vigorously debated. See, e.g., Robert J. LaLonde and
Brian D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities,
58 U. CHi. L. Rav. 953 (1991) (criticizing Weiler's "rogue employer thesis"); Paul C. Weiler, Hard
Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 1015 (1991) (reasserting
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the kinds of pressure the secret ballot election was designed to prevent.'"
The Board did not offer any further insight regarding antiunion insignia
until its 1961 opinion in Chas. V. Weise Co.19 In Weise, the employer
provided badges stating "Vote on the right side-Vote No ' 20 and told
employees "I will be wearing this badge . . these are available for
everyone to wear. If you wish, take one as you leave [the meeting]." ' 2'
The Board's regional director held that the employer's conduct interfered
with the election (which the union lost) and ordered a new vote. 22 As
he explained:
By making available such badges, even if not urging employees to
wear them the employer was in effect providing a means by which
employees would be placed in a position of making an open declaration
of preference. If the employee accepted and wore the badge, it was
tantamount to expressing an overt anti-union preference, while, on
the other hand, if the employees refused to accept the badge or did
not wear it, he [sic] thereby indicated a pro-union sentiment, or, at
the least, failed to indicate an anti-union sentiment.
2 3
The employer had argued that since unions could distribute prounion
insignia, employers should be permitted to provide antiunion insignia.
24
The Board rebuffed the employer's defense, stating:
We feel, . . . because of the Employer's control over the tenure
and the working conditions of the employees involved, that its making
of campaign insignia available under the conditions described above
the sigrtificant impact unlawful employer activity has on workers' exercise of their rights).
Adjudicating the debate between Weiler and his critics would be beyond the scope of this article.
Weiler draws blood, however, when he emphasizes that many American workers believe that their
employers would retaliate against them if they openly supported a union. According to Weiler, a
Lou Harris poll demonstrates that "fully 43% [of nonunionized workers] believe that their employer
would fire, demote, or otherwise make life miserable for union supporters in a representation
campaign." Paul C. Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone: The Wagner Act at Fifty, 23 HAuv. J. ON
LEGIS. 1, 11 n.18 (1986) (emphasis in original). More recently, Weiler reports that "[fn a 1988
Gallup Poll, 69 percent of the respondents agreed (and only 21 percent disagreed) with the proposition
that corporations sometimes harass, intimidate, or fire employees who openly speak out in favor
of a union." PAUL C. WEILER, GovEaNNo THE WORKPLACE 117 n.25 (1990).
These findings speak to the heart of the matter. It is the workers' perceptions that must be
paramount in deciding whether an election has occurred in a free and secure environment. Considering
how many workers honestly believe that their employers would retaliate against union supporters,
it is understandable that they could feel trepidation when management invites them to wear antiunion
insignia. Under such circumstances, the "choice" to refuse the insignia seems far from free.
18. Section 9(c) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)) provides for "a secret ballot of
employees." The reason for electoral anonymity is to insulate workers from the pressures and
coercion they would otherwise face. As the Board has explained, "[t]o protect the right of an
employee to a free and uncoerced choice in representation elections, the Board and the courts have
long and consistently applied the rule that a ballot which reveals the identity of the voter is void."
A.G. Parrott Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 259, 259 n.3 (1981), quoted in W.LIAUs, supra note 1, at 434.
Such emphasis on ballot secrecy becomes a farce if employees are pressured into revealing their
preferences before the election.
19. 133 N.L.R.B. 765 (1961).
20. Id. at 765.
21. Id. at 765-66. The employer also instructed its supervisors to wear these badges and to give
them to any workers who asked for them. Id. at 766.
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placed the employees in the position of declaring themselves as to
union preference just as if they had been interrogated as to such
preference, and thereby interfered with the free and untrammeled
choice of the employees. 21
Weise is an insightful opinion. An employer's distribution of insignia
does compel workers to take a public stand on the representation issue,
which undermines ballot secrecy. Furthermore, such a distribution is not
comparable to a labor organization's provision of insignia. Employer and
union are not similarly situated, for only the former has the power to
hire, fire, discipline, promote, reassign, and take myriad other steps to
affect the quality of a worker's professional life. Given this stark disparity
in power, it is reasonable to formulate separate rules for employers and
unions .26
The only weakness in Weise is the analogy the opinion draws between
distributing antiunion insignia and interrogating an employee regarding
unionization. This analogy is vulnerable on both doctrinal and practical
grounds. First, recent Board decisions have given employers broad latitude
to interrogate workers without violating the Act. In Rossmore House,27
the Board held that it was not per se unlawful for an employer to
question an open and active union supporter concerning his union sym-
pathies. Instead, the test is "whether under all of the circumstances the
interrogation reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights
guaranteed by the Act." 28 The Board extended this approach to employees
who are not "open and active" union supporters in Sunnyvale Medical
Clinic. 29
This development has not gone uncriticized. In Sunnyvale, for example,
Board Member Dennis argued in dissent:
Ordinarily, an employer's questioning an employee who is not a
self-proclaimed union adherent does "tend to restrain, coerce, or
interfere" with statutory rights. Because the employee has not chosen
25. Id.
26. The Fifth Circuit recognized this disparity of power in NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Co.,
415 F.2d 26, 30 (5th Cir. 1969), where it held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding
"that a promise of increased or improved benefits by an employer to induce employees to reject
a union is objectionable conduct, while similar promises on the part of a union are not." The
court explained that "[an employer in an unorganized plant, with his almost absolute control over
employment, wages, and working conditions, occupies a totally different position in a representation
contest than a union, which is merely an outsider seeking entrance to the plant." Id., quoted in
Becker, supra note 1, at 572. As the Fifth Circuit concluded, "[tihe opportunity for employer
domination and misrepresentation is manifest," so the Board was justified in holding employers
and unions to different standards. Golden Age Beverage, 415 F.2d at 30; see also Christensen,
supra note 10, at 265 (observing "the known fact that when the boss talks, employees may suspect
that he is doing more than talking").
27. 269 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984), enforced sub nom. Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
Union, Local 11 v. N.L.R.B., 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985).
28. Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. at 1177. The Board added that factors to be considered
include: "(1) the background; (2) the nature of the information sought; (3) the identity of the
questioner; and (4) the place and method of interrogation." Id. at 1178 n.20. For an overview of
the Board's doctrinal evolution in this area, see WILLIAS, supra note 1, at 200-12.
29. 277 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1985).
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voluntarily to disclose his union activities or beliefs, the employer's
prying into this sensitive subject necessarily chills the employee's
freedom of action. 30
In light of Rossmore and Sunnyvale, the Weise analogy between in-
terrogation and distribution of antiunion emblems offers insufficient pro-
tection to employees. Management could readily claim that its offer of
antiunion insignia was not coercive under the circumstances, which could
find favor with a Board insensitive to Dennis' concerns regarding inter-
rogation. 3l
Furthermore, inviting workers to wear antiunion emblems can be sub-
stantially more intrusive than querying them about their union sympathies.
Interrogation can be informal and confidential, whereas the offer of
insignia forces the employee to make a public decision to wear or reject
the button. In essence, the employee is asked to become an ambulatory
campaign poster, and her choice will be easily observed by management
and coworkers alike. For these reasons, the Weise Board's reliance on
the interrogation rationale falls somewhat short of the mark. Offering
antiunion insignia is not merely interrogation; it is a particularly intrusive
and coercive means of interrogation.
This problem notwithstanding, the Board followed Weise's reasoning
in its 1962 decision in Beiser Aviation Corp.32 In Beiser, the Board held
that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by distributing antiunion cards
for workers to wear.33 The Board indicated that such distribution is illegal
per se, stating:
[W]e regard it as immaterial whether, in the process of distributing
the cards, the Respondent accompanied such distribution by inde-
pendent coercive conduct. It is sufficient in the circumstances of this
case that by placing an employee in a position where he must declare
himself as either for or against [the union], the Respondent coerced
employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1).14
The Board's 1967 decision in Automotive Controls Corp." is to similar
effect. Here, in an opinion affirmed by the Board, the trial examiner
30. Id. at 1219 (Dennis, dissenting in part).
31. It should be remembered, however, that Rossmore and Sunnyvale do not give employers
carte blanche to question their employees regarding unionization. In the recent cases of Structural
Composites Indus., 304 N.L.R.B. 729 (1991) and Montgomery Ward & Co., 288 N.L.R.B. 126
(1988), remanded on other grounds, 904 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1990), the Board found management's
interrogation to be coercive under the circumstances and thus violative of Section 8(a)(l). I believe
that distributing antiunion insignia constitutes an inherently coercive form of interrogation and
should also be held beyond the safe harbors of Rossmore and Sunnyvale.
32. 135 N.L.R.B. 399 (1962).
33. Id. at 400.
34. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 495 (1965) (§ 8(a)(l)
of the Act transgressed where employer asked employees to display antiunion stickers on their cars);
Ralph Wells & Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1965) (finding § 8(a)(l) violation where foreman tried to
intimidate workers into accepting antiunion stickers); Lyon, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 54 (1963) (invalidating
election where employer provided "Vote No" signs and plant manager pinned one on a worker's
back), enforced per curiam, 341 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1965).
35. 165 N.L.R.B. 450 (1967), enforced as modified, 406 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1969).
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ruled that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) when it distributed an-
tiunion signs in the workplace. 36 The trial examiner reasoned that "em-
ployees were thereby impliedly threatened that if they did not accept the
signs they would possibly be visited with reprisals. It also constituted a
form of interrogation, the purpose of which was to discover the employees'
prounion or antiunion sympathies. '3 7
The employer in Automotive alleged that it provided the signs pursuant
to a request from several employees. 8 Curiously, neither the trial examiner
nor the Board discussed whether this could be relevant. One could argue,
for example, that when an employer merely honors a worker's request
for antiunion insignia it is facilitating the exercise of the worker's Section
7 right not to support a union. In this situation, the mutuality argument
raised by the employer in Chas. V. Weise Co. 39 begins to gather force.
Whereas unions have the funds to buy and distribute prounion insignia,
the individual antiunion employee may not be able to afford his own
emblems. It may therefore be fair to permit employers to provide antiunion
insignia if two safeguards are observed. First, the employer must not
initiate the distribution, but must be responding to a specific employee
request. Second, the employer must apprise all employees that there will
be no rewards or reprisals for either accepting or declining the insignia.
In this manner we might enable antiunion employees to campaign on a
par with their prounion colleagues while minimizing the likelihood of
implied coercion.
Such reasoning, however, ultimately collapses. The antiunion employee
does not need the employer's assistance to campaign against a labor
organization. First, the individual can announce his position simply by
refusing to wear the union's insignia. This refusal to wear prounion
emblems could deliver as clear and effective a statement as the donning
of antiunion insignia. Second, the individualist could send an equally
potent message by defacing prounion insignia in some manner, such as
by drawing a red slash through a button or wearing it upside down.
Third, even the most impoverished employee could create antiunion in-
signia of her own with everyday items such as paper or plastic and felt-
tip pens. Even those workers who wanted "store bought" buttons would
usually find them quite affordable. 40 In essence, the argument that the
indigent employee needs the employer's assistance has virtually no basis
in fact.
Furthermore, the two proposed safeguards are unlikely to achieve their
purpose. Requiring an employee to ask for antiunion emblems before
the employer can supply them is problematic for at least two reasons.
36. Automotive Control Corp., 165 N.L.R.B. at 453, 456.
37. Id. at 456.
38. Id. at 453.
39. 133 N.L.R.B. 765 (1961), discussed supra at notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
40. The feasibility of these suggestions is demonstrated in Singer Co., 199 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1205-
06 (1972), enforced, 480 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1973), where workers both made their own antiunion
badges and purchased others which they then wore and distributed at the plant.
[Vol. 24
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The first problem is that the requirement could be easily circumvented-
the employer always could "ask" a trusted worker to "ask" for the
insignia. The evidentiary quagmires of such a rule are hardly worth the
effort. Moreover, the fact that one employee requested antiunion insignia
should not justify an employer's plant-wide distribution of emblems.
Those who did not request insignia might feel that they were being forced
either to support the employer or risk incurring its wrath.
Such fears of reprisal, unfortunately, could not be quashed simply
because the employer offers assurances of non-retaliation. This conclusion,
albeit bleak, is supported by common sense. If a worker suspects that
her employer would discriminate against union supporters, why should
she believe its protests to the contrary? If we are honestly committed to
the freedom to choose or reject unionization, it is better to forbid
employers from providing antiunion emblems even when their workers
request them.
Numerous other cases reflect the Board's prohibitory line of authority. 41
In 1978, the Board reiterated in Pillowtex Corp.42 that such distribution
constitutes grounds for vacating an election. The Board reasoned:
When employees are approached by a supervisor and offered [an-
tiunion] buttons ... they have only two alternatives: accept the buttons
41. See, e.g., American Mfg. Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 248 (1972) (employer's production and distri-
bution of antiunion badges found violative of the Act); Macklanburg-Duncan Co., 179 N.L.R.B.
848 (1969) (election set aside based on employer's distribution of antiunion T-shirts and buttons);
Mid States Sportswear, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 559 (1967) (Section 8(a)(1) of the Act violated where
employer pressured workers to wear napkins and pins with antiunion messages), enforced in relevant
part, 412 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1969); Earle Indus., 146 N.L.R.B. 536 (1964) (employer unlawfully
requested employees to wear "Vote No" signs and attempted to pin them on employees). American
Mfg. also raises the delicate issue of whether an emblem is truly antiunion or merely proemployer.
In that case the badges stated, "I AM FOR AMERICAN MANUFACTURING CO." which, if
taken literally, does not speak to the representation issue. See American Mfg., 196 N.L.R.B. at
257. These badges were circulated during a heated representation campaign, however, so the trial
examiner reasonably treated them as a form of antiunion insignia. Id. The trial examiner's approach
has strong intuitive appeal. Employers should be free to distribute procompany- buttons to boost
morale, foster esprit de corps, and so forth. When such buttons are distributed in response to a
union drive, however, they take on the added character of being "antiunion" and should be treated
accordingly. The Board seemingly adopted the trial examiner's stance toward procompany insignia
in Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1978). In finding an employer's actions unlawful, the
Board explained:
It is well established that an employer's request during an election campaign,
that an employee wear a "vote no" button or other proemployer insignia constitutes
a form of interrogation because, by agreeing or refusing to wear the button, the
employee is forced into an open declaration either for or against the Union.
Id. at 1044 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
More recently, however, the Board rejected this sensible approach. In Oklahoma Installation Co.,
309 N.L.R.B. 776 (1992), the Board held that an employer did not violate the Act by distributing
clothing bearing the company's logo during an election campaign. The Board emphasized that the
clothing apparently did not include "any additional writing or insignia indicating an explicit pro-
employer or antiunion preference in the upcoming election." Id. at 776; see also Sterling Faucet
Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 1031, 1037 (1973) (finding no violation where buttons with company insignia
were made available to workers during campaign). Such reasoning is facile, for in the context of
a representation election it is obvious that "proemployer" materials are fig leaves for antiunion
sentiments.
42. 234 N.L.R.B. 560 (1978).
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and thereby acknowledge opposition to the Union; or reject them,
and thereby indicate their support of the Union. In either case, the
fact that the employees must make an observable choice is a form
of interrogation. Furthermore, should employees feel compelled to
choose a button containing a message opposite to their views, that
is coercion and it likewise interferes with the election.4 3
The continuing vitality of the prohibitory strain is demonstrated in the
Board's 1991 opinion in Douglas & Lomason Co." Here the Board found
an unfair labor practice where a supervisor announced the availability
of buttons stating "Just Say No to Unions" and checked to see which
employees took one. As the administrative law judge explained, the
supervisor's conduct constituted "surveillance designed to determine the
union or antiunion sympathies of employees, an action which violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act." ' 45
As such cases demonstrate, the Board frequently has sanctioned em-
ployers (either by finding them guilty of Section 8(a)(1) violations or by
vacating their electoral victories) for distributing antiunion emblems to
their workers. Unfortunately, however, the Board has not managed to
address this issue in a clear and consistent way. This failure has had its
costs. As explained below, the law remains riddled with exceptions of
dubious merit.
III. THE PERMISSIVE SCHOOL
Despite the prevalence of prohibitory cases, a number of Board decisions
have condoned employer distribution of antiunion emblems. Although
such cases are "outnumbered" by the prohibitory body of precedent,
they are nonetheless disturbing. Instead of transmitting a clear doctrinal
picture, the Board projects a distorted image indicating that employer
distribution is usually objectionable but there appear to be rather cloudy
and ill-reasoned exceptions. As a consequence, it becomes increasingly
43. Id. at 560 (footnote omitted); see also Cook Family Foods, Ltd., 311 N.L.R.B. No. 178
(Aug. 20, 1993) (unlawfully pressuring employees to wear antiunion T-shirts); Lott's Elec. Co., 293
N.L.R.B. 297 (1989) (unlawfully distributing antiunion buttons), enforced, 891 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.
1989); Seville Flexpack Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. 518 (1988) (unlawfully requesting workers to wear
antiunion buttons); National Medical Hosp. of Compton, 287 N.L.R.B. 149 (1987) (unlawfully
coercing employee to wear antiunion button), enforced, 907 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1990); Nissen Foods
(USA) Co., 272 N.L.R.B. 371 (1984) (unlawfully soliciting employees to wear antiunion buttons,
interrogating them for not doing so, and applying dress code in discriminatory fashion); R.L. White
Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 575 (1982) (unlawfully encouraging employees to wear procompany T-shirts);
Great Western Coca Cola Bottling Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 520 (1981) (unlawfully polling employees by
repeatedly offering them antiunion buttons); Tappan Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 656 (1981) (offering antiunion
T-shirts to workers interfered with election); Reeves Rubber, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 134 (1980) (unlawfully
urging employees to wear items with antiunion slogans); Great Dane Trailers Indiana, Inc., 252
N.L.R.B. 67 (1980) (unlawfully soliciting employees to wear antiunion stickers); Catalina Yachts,
250 N.L.R.B. 283 (1980) (unlawfully distributing antiunion buttons and T-shirts), enforced per
curiam, 679 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1982).
44. 304 N.L.R.B. 322 (1991).
45. Id. at 328. The judge also found that a supervisor violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
telling an employee that she should wear an antiunion button if she wanted to keep her job. Id.
The Board affirmed the judge's opinion in its entirety. Id. at 322.
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difficult for parties to assess the Board's decision in any given case."
Indeed, the struggle between the Board's prohibitory and permissive
schools resembles a match between anemic wrestlers too dispirited to win
the match.
The Board's 1966 opinion in Murray Ohio Manufacturing Co.47 indicates
the Board's lack of consistency and resolve. In an opinion adopted by
the Board, the trial examiner held that the employer violated Section
8(a)(1) by encouraging its workers to wear antiunion cards.4 No violation
was found, however, where a foreman pinned an antiunion card on a
worker's clothing but then promptly removed it.49 This decision is coun-
terintuitive; even though the foreman removed the button, he already
had sent a rather coercive antiunion message by first pinning it on the
worker. Murray Ohio is not particularly disturbing, because there were
sufficient additional grounds for finding a violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. Nonetheless, the decision raises the concern that the Board
might be too willing to overlook "minor" instances of coercion or to
dismiss them as de minimus.
Indeed, the Board exhibited a rather cavalier approach in its 1974
decision in Acute Systems, Ltd.50 Here the Board did not find a violation
even though the company's president pinned an antiunion button on an
employee." The administrative law judge characterized this incident as
a "playful gesture" rather than "a means of determining the employee's
views." '5 2 The minimization of what occurred is hardly persuasive. As
Board Member Jenkins argued in dissent, the president's action could
"only lead the employees to believe that they are being required to
demonstrate their allegiance to management" and was "inherently de-
46. The convoluted and self-contradictory nature of Board doctrine is deleterious both in principle
and in practice. First, the Board's inconsistency can undermine the public's perception of its
administrative rationality, competence, and legitimacy. As Jerry Mashaw has warned, "[i]f the
substantive outputs of administration seem contradictory, or explicable only in terms of the undisclosed
propensities of different deciders, then we become, as Kafka's K, the objects of the personal caprice
of state officials." JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 202 (1985).
Indeed, the Board's performance adds resonance to Christopher Edley's cynical conclusion that
"politics is lurking in almost every agency decision and in every corner of administrative law."
CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY
170 (1990).
Second, the Board's interminable flip-flopping can only increase litigation, as the parties' efforts
to settle before trial are frustrated by their inability to predict how the Board might rule. As one
commentator has observed, "[elven experienced labor lawyers are having great difficulty advising
clients on how to obey the law." John S. Irving, Jr., The Crisis at the NLRB: A Call for Reordering
Priorities, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 47, 47 (1981). And as Irving concludes, "[tlhe Board ... has
contributed to its case load by refusing to reconcile inconsistent results in similar cases." Id. at
64. On the relationship between legal uncertainty and litigation, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 511 (3d ed. 1986); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection
of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
47. 156 N.L.R.B. 840 (1966).
48. Id. at 843, 851-52.
49. Id. at 851-52 & n.37.
50. 214 N.L.R.B. 879 (1974).
51. Id. at 881-83.
52. Id. at 882-83.
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structive of employee rights."" Furthermore, the president's "playful"
attitude was irrelevant because the Board repeatedly has held that "[i]t
is no defense that a violation is committed in a friendly or joking
manner."
5 4
The Board nonetheless continued its permissive approach in its 1976
McIndustries, Inc." decision. Here too, a company president distributed
antiunion cards and allegedly pinned them on several employees. The
Board did not find this objectionable, however, because there was "no
evidence that any card was pinned on any employee against the employee's
wishes."''56
Such reasoning is shallow and deceptive. It is disingenuous to argue
that no workers protested because they may have been too intimidated
to argue with such an aggressive company president. Furthermore, even
if those particular employees were not offended, other workers observing
the president could have felt pressured to wear the insignia. Mclndustries
thus turns a blind eye to employees most in need of the Board's pro-
tection-those who may feel too vulnerable to speak out on their own.
Indeed, the likelihood of coercion was heightened significantly by the
employer's other actions of unlawfully prohibiting the workers from
distributing union handbills or wearing union insignia at work.57 Given
this lawless disregard for the workers' Section 7 rights, no excuse existed
for the employer's abusive distribution of antiunion emblems.5"
Other Board opinions have condoned similar misconduct. For example,
the Board's 1983 opinion in Daniel Construction Co.59 found no violation
even though, in the course of a representation campaign, supervisors told
workers procompany jackets were available and offered to take the names
and sizes of interested workers to the employer. In an opinion affirmed
by the Board, the administrative law judge stated:
It is clear that Respondent's purpose and intent in soliciting pur-
chases of the jackets was to aid it in its campaign against the Union,
but it is equally clear that Respondent did not intend, or attempt to
carry out, the sales of jackets as a method to ferret out union
53. Id. at 879 n.l (Jenkins, dissenting).
54. Conagra, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 609, 609 (1980). The Board also has emphasized:
It has long been recognized that the test of interference, restraint, and coercion
under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not turn on a respondent's motive, courtesy,
or gentleness, or on whether the coercion succeeded or failed .... Rather, the test
is whether the supervisor's conduct reasonably tended to interfere with the free
exercise of the employee's rights under the Act.
Florida Steel Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 45, 45 (1976); see also Ethyl Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 431, 434
(1977) (explaining that "the coercive and unlawful effect of a statement is not blunted merely
because interrogations of, warnings to, or disparaging statements about union adherents are ac-
companied by laughter or made in an offhand humorous way") (footnote omitted).
55. 224 N.L.R.B. 1298 (1976).
56. Id. at 1298 n.I.
57. Id. at 1298, 1301-02.
58. See also Wm. T. Burnett & Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1092-93 (1984) (finding no violation
where supervisor tossed antiunion button toward table where employees were sitting).
59. 266 N.L.R.B. 1090, 1099-1100 (1983).
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sentiments. Use by the Union of the identical campaign tactic-wearing
of jackets with logos on them-is indicative of the methods of the
campaigners .60
The judge's argument cannot stand. It is irrelevant that union supporters
wore prounion jackets because the union did not have the power to hire,
fire, and otherwise dictate the nature of the workers' employment. Fur-
thermore, the provision of antiunion materials in Daniel is particularly
problematic because the supervisors offered to record the names of
interested workers and provide them to management. 6' Those actions
naturally could have suggested that the employer was keeping a list of
"loyal" and "disloyal" workers. 62
Despite these flaws, in 1989 the Board followed suit in Phillips In-
dustries.63 In Phillips, the administrative law judge concluded that the
employer did not violate the Act when its production superintendent
distributed company T-shirts to workers who requested them.6 The judge
concluded that such distribution was acceptable because the employer
"took no action to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
Section 7 rights by forcing them to choose T-shirts or not. '65
Phillips is difficult to evaluate because the judge related few of the
circumstances and the Board affirmed this aspect of the decision without
any discussion. 66 Nonetheless, one can criticize the judge for ignoring the
active supervisory role in distributing the T-shirts and for assuming that
the workers did not have to choose whether to accept them. Given that
a supervisor provided them upon request, one could agree with the judge
that the matter was entirely voluntary. At the very least, however, the
employer should have assured the workers that their acceptance or re-
jection of the T-shirts would have no bearing on their future prospects
with the company. Furthermore, it seems short-sighted to say that workers
do not have to "choose" when they see coworkers-who may be com-
petitors for promotions and other job-related benefits-receiving the T-
shirts. Phillips exemplifies the Board's penchant for ignoring the implied
coercion of everyday work life in favor of a superficial analysis of the
cases.
67
60. Id. at 1100.
61. Id.
62. Although the employer's witnesses testified that they did not actually keep a list of who
purchased a jacket, id., that fact is of little force. What matters is that employees reasonably could
have believed that supervisors were recording names for purposes of determining their loyalty.
63. 295 N.L.R.B. 717 (1989).
64. Id. at 733.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 717-19, 733.
67. Numerous scholars have commented upon the prevalence of alienation and coercion in the
workplace. See, e.g., ROBERT BLAUNER, ALIENATION AND FREEDOM 183 (1964) (asserting that "al-
ienation remains a widespread phenomenon in the factory today"); ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM
FREEDOM 139 (1941) (describing the employer-employee relationship as a coldly instrumental ar-
rangement in which "the owner of capital employs another human being as he 'employs' a machine");
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE
OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 274 (1987) (concluding that "[w]orkers continue to suffer strongly felt
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The 1991 Vemco" decision offers the most recent example of the
Board's permissive school. In Vemco, the Board concluded that supervisors
had not violated Section 8(a)(1) by offering employees antiunion buttons
in exchange for their prounion emblems. 69 The Board argued that no
unlawful interrogation had transpired because the employees were wearing
prounion insignia and so their viewpoints were already known. 70 Fur-
thermore, "the offers were not accompanied by any threats or coercion." ' 71
Neither of these reasons is persuasive. That the employees wore prounion
insignia merely increases the supervisors' culpability, for it should have
been obvious that the employees did not want antiunion emblems. More-
over, there may have been no need for explicit "threats or coercion"
because the employer already had violated the workers' Section 7 rights
in a host of other ways. 72
Vemco thus culminates a line of cases where the Board has condoned
employer distribution of antiunion insignia. The common thread in these
opinions is that the Board has failed to appreciate the likelihood of
implied coercion whenever management "invites" workers to wear an-
tiunion emblems. In the heat of a representation campaign, workers
reasonably may fear that the choice is hardly a free one. This sense of
coercion can only be deepened where, as has often been the case, the
employer has violated Section 7 in other ways or has failed to assure
employees that their careers will not be affected by their response to the
insignia.
IV. THE MODERATE SCHOOL
Yet a third vein of Board authority seeks to strike a balance between
the prohibitory and permissive schools. This moderate school-which
appears to represent the predominant view-permits employers to provide
antiunion insignia if there is no individualized distribution. Notwithstand-
ing this school's ascendancy, it places style over substance and fails to
shield workers from possible coercion.
experiences of powerlessness and humiliation").
This realization that the economically dependent may be exploited is hardly limited to twentieth-
century theorists. Indeed, one need look no further than the Federalist Papers to find the observation
that "[i]n the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a
power over his will." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 400 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
This is not to suggest that employers are inherently "evil" or inexorably bent on controlling the
minds of their workers. To the contrary, it is simply a plea for the Board to recognize the economic
vulnerability of employees and to appreciate the ever-present possibilities for coercion. As Archibald
Cox has observed, "[any argument which discloses the speaker's strong wishes is not wholly an
appeal to reason if the listener is in the speaker's power." ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 143 (11th ed. 1991).
68. Vemco, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 911 (1991).
69. Id. at 913.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The Board found that the employer had violated the Act by, inter alia, laying off sixty
employees to discourage support for the union. Id. Such a massive, illegal discharge of the employees'
peers clearly could have added a coercive flavor to the supervisors' proposed trade.
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The Board initiated the moderate approach with its 1973 decision in
Farah Manufacturing Co. 73 In Farah, the employer placed antiunion
buttons in a box available to workers. 74 In an opinion affirmed by the
Board, the administrative law judge found the employer's conduct unob-
jectionable. The judge stressed that the employer merely made the emblems
available to employees; the employees were not pressured to accept the
buttons (with one exception) and apparently no explicit effort was made
to observe who wore them. Under these circumstances, the judge concluded
that the distribution was lawful. 7
The judge provided little reasoning, but he was unwilling to conclude
that it is objectionable merely to provide employees with antiunion in-
signia. The weakness inherent in this moderate approach is that it opens
the door to subtle abuse. Even the least sophisticated employer would
find it convenient to place antiunion emblems at the workplace and later
observe who wore them. Moreover, workers might still have a reasonable
sense of coercion, especially since the employer in Farah never advised
them that there would be no reprisals for declining to wear the antiunion
insignia.
The Board's 1978 decision in Black Dot, Inc. 76 may constitute the most
carefully reasoned defense of the moderate position. In Black Dot, the
employer placed its buttons in the workers' cafeteria with a large red
arrow pointing toward them. 77 The employer told its supervisory personnel
not to discuss the buttons with the employees, but a number of the
supervisors wore them at work. 78 When the union complained that the
employer was "trying to intimidate union supporters and get them to
'tip their hand,' ' 79 the employer assured the work force that "wearing
(or not wearing) a button is a strictly personal and voluntary act which
in no way will favorabley [sic] or adversely affect any Black Dot em-
ployee.' '80
Based on these facts, the Board overruled the regional director and
held that the employer had not interfered with the election. The Board
distinguished Chas. V. Weise Co."' and its progeny on the grounds that
Black Dot's supervisors did not help distribute the buttons.12 The Board
reasoned:
Here, the supervisors were completely absent from the distribution
process, which was unaccompanied by any coercive conduct. Super-
73. 204 N.L.R.B. 173 (1973).
74. Id. at 175.
75. The judge found an isolated violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, however, where a
supervisor pressured an employee to accept an antiunion button. Id.
76. 239 N.L.R.B. 929 (1978).




81. Chas. V. Weise Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 765 (1961), discussed supra notes 19-26 and accompanying
text.
82. Black Dot, 239 N.L.R.B. at 929.
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visors did not pressure employees to make an open choice between
the Company and the Union. The Employer merely provided a supply
of buttons at a central location .... [T]he Employer's assurances
[against reprisals] further support the conclusion that the mere avail-
ability of buttons in these circumstances would not reasonably tend
to interfere with the employees' free choice ....
We therefore conclude that the Employer's conduct in merely making
buttons available to employees on a voluntary basis, in the absence
of supervisory involvement in the distribution process and unaccom-
panied by independent coercive conduct, does not require that the
election be set aside. 8
3
The Board's logic may appear sound, especially because the employer
emphasized that wearing the buttons was optional. When pushed, however,
the Board's line of defense crumbles. It is naive to emphasize the lack
of supervisory involvement when some of them wore the insignia and
the buttons were placed in a conspicuous place with the employer's "large
red paper arrow" pointing to them. 4 The employees did not need to be
psychologists to discern that the employer wanted them to wear the
insignia. Furthermore, the employer's assurances against reprisal were
given too late-they were given only after the union complained and
could reasonably be viewed as an expedient fig leaf for the Board hearing
that was sure to follow. Finally, the Board ignored the fact that employees
would still be put to the choice-at the employer's initiative-of either
wearing the antiunion buttons or risk being regarded as union advocates.
For these reasons, the regional director was justified in concluding that
the election had been fatally tainted.
The Board's moderate school thus draws a bright line between cases
where an employer simply makes antiunion insignia available and situa-
tions where it individually distributes such insignia. In Maremont Corp.,85
for example, the administrative law judge concluded that the employer
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by distributing procompany buttons
and hats to the workers. The judge explained:
An employer may lawfully, and in a nondiscriminatory manner,
make proemployer buttons available at a neutral location where the
employees are not under the surveillance of management. However,
the Board has held that it is per se unlawful for a supervisor to
engage in the distribution of such buttons.8 6
This dichotomy is far too simplistic because it assumes that employees
are not under "surveillance" as long as they receive the insignia in a
83. Id. (citations omitted).
84. Id.
85. 251 N.L.R.B. 1617, 1623 (1980), enforcement denied, 666 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1981).
86. Id. at 1623. This aspect of the judge's decision apparently was adopted by the Board but
was not discussed in its opinion. Id. at 1617. The Sixth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's
ruling, simply stating in a one-paragraph order that it "is not supported by sufficient evidence and
is clearly erroneous." Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 1037, 1037 (6th Cir. 1981). The court's
cryptic order obviously fails to identify where the Board may have erred in its reasoning or how
such issues should properly be resolved.
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"neutral location" and not directly from supervisors. Such reasoning is
facile because the emblems obviously originate with the employer re-
gardless of how they are distributed. Furthermore, employers easily can
identify who wears the emblems regardless of whether they are handed
out by the president or plucked from a box. Opinions such as Black
Dot and Maremont elevate style over substance by placing meaningless
and artificial restrictions on the distribution of insignia.
Despite its artificial nature, the moderate school has been reinforced
by two recent Board decisions. These cases held that the employer violated
the Act, but the Board took pains to note that employers may provide
antiunion insignia if certain limitations are observed. The Board's 1991
decision in Horwath & Co. 7 demonstrates the dominance of the moderate
school. In Horwath, a supervisor approached ten employees and offered
them antiunion stickers. 88 In a lengthy, well-developed opinion, the ad-
ministrative law judge held that this action violated Section 8(a)(1). 89 He
explained:
[A] central statutory vice in an employer's soliciting of employees to
wear a procompany campaign emblem is that, like more direct forms
of union-related "interrogation," it puts pressure on employees openly
to declare that which they have a right to withhold from their employer
(and from their fellow employees)-their feelings about union rep-
resentation. 9o
The judge acknowledged, however, that "it is neither per se a violation
of Section 8(a)(1), nor does it require a rerun election, for an employer
'merely' to make procompany emblems 'available' to employees." 9' Hor-
wath thus purports to protect employee rights, but makes it woefully
easy for management to continue its distribution.
The Board's 1992 opinion in House of Raeford Farms, Inc.92 represents
its most recent reaffirmation of the moderate position. In Raeford Farms,
the employer ordered one thousand antiunion T-shirts that employees
could obtain at the company supply room. Employees had to sign a list
when receiving a shirt (a standard practice for receiving any inventory)
and the employer refused to give shirts to workers wearing prounion
insignia. 93 The Board found this unlawful, stating:
[T]he Respondent's practice of recording the names of employees who
accepted the antiunion apparel reasonably tended to interfere with
87. 304 N.L.R.B. 805 (1991).
88. Id. at 805.
89. Id. at 816.
90. Id. at 815. The judge concluded that the employer had transgressed the Act because its
supervisor's actions "would tend to be seen as 'pressure' from management to 'join the campaign'
against the union. Id. at 816. The Board agreed that the Act had been violated and also ordered
a new election. Id. at 805-06.
91. Id. at 815 (emphasis added).
92. 308 N.L.R.B. 568 (1992).
93. Id. at 570.
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employee free choice in the election. As noted, the Respondent did
not simply provide a supply of T-shirts at a central location, unac-
companied by any coercive conduct. Rather, while the availability of
the T-shirts purported to be on a voluntary basis, to receive the T-
shirts, employees were required to refrain from displaying support
for the Union and sign a list acknowledging receipt of the T-shirt.
Such employer recordkeeping of the employee's antiunion sentiments
enables the Respondent to discern the leanings of employees, and to
direct pressure at particular employees in its campaign efforts. Given
the circumstances of this case, it would be reasonable for the employees
to conclude that the recording of employees' names as they received
the antiunion T-shirts was done for purposes other than merely mon-
itoring supplies. We accordingly find that the Respondent's recording
of names of those accepting the T-shirts reasonably tended to interfere
with the employees' free choice of a collective-bargaining represen-
tative, and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.9
The Board's decision was prudent because the employer's actions rea-
sonably could have suggested that employees were under surveillance. It
is unfortunate, however, that the Board did not clarify and restructure
the law. Instead, Raeford Farms repeats the moderate fallacy by implying
that employers may lawfully provide antiunion insignia at a central
location if they do not engage in overtly coercive behavior.95 This approach
fails to protect employees from anything but the most obvious forms of
managerial interference.
V. A PROPOSAL TO END THE CONFLICT
The befuddled state of the law cries out for correction. For both
normative and practical reasons the status quo must not continue. From
a normative perspective, employees should not have to endure the prospect
of having an employer "offer" them antiunion insignia. Such distribution
forces the worker either to identify her union sentiments or to serve as
the boss's poster child in possible conflict with her actual beliefs. As a
practical matter, the indeterminacy in the doctrine has bred little except
confusion and litigation.9
We can eliminate these problems with the use of a simple prophylactic
rule: employers should be forbidden from offering antiunion insignia to
94. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. One possible explanation for the naive and self-contradictory nature of the Board's decisions
is that the Board literally does not know what it is talking about. Christopher Edley explains:
The National Labor Relations Board is an especially easy target for skeptics of
agency expertise, consistency and neutrality. From its inception, the controversial
nature of the NLRB's business has subjected it to attack, and not without reason.
With respect to expertise, it has been observed that courts routinely incant that
the board is expert in industrial relations, so that it can evaluate the effects of
suspect management actions on workers; yet the board does no empirical work,
nor does its staff include experts in social science, industrial relations, or business
administration who might ably address such questions.
EDLaY, supra note 46, at 51 (footnote omitted).
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their workers.9 7 Such a prohibition would not transgress Section 8(c) of
the Act 98 because employers and their supervisory personnel would still
be free to wear insignia,9 make speeches, and engage in other forms of
legitimate antiunion campaigning.' l° Management would thus retain its
freedom of self expression; it simply would be forbidden from using its
employees as political puppets.' 0'
The workers' Section 7 rights would also be safeguarded because
employees would remain free to buy or create their own antiunion in-
signia. 0 2 In short, we could protect the right of workers to debate,
campaign, and vote on unionization with no harm to legitimate needs
for self expression. Moreover, the clear and simple nature of the pro-
hibition should put a merciful end to much of the litigation in this field.
The choice, therefore, seems clear. We can continue to dwell in a
doctrinal quagmire with confusion, conflict, and coercion or we can
protect the workers' Section 7 rights by prohibiting employer distribution
of antiunion insignia. Adopting the second alternative would do nothing
to prevent employers and employees from campaigning robustly in rep-
resentation elections. To the contrary, prohibiting employer distribution
of antiunion insignia would merely help assure that workers are treated
with the dignity they deserve. Workers can speak and act for themselves;
they do not need management to stand between the buttons and freedom
of choice.
97. To provide maximum deterrence, employer distribution of antiunion insignia should be
considered a violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act as well as a breach of laboratory conditions.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988), quoted supra at note 10.
99. See, e.g., Kawneer Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 983, 994-95 (1967), enforced in relevant part, 413
F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1969), where the Board condoned a supervisor's manufacture of antiunion buttons
on the employer's time and with the employer's materials. The Board did find a violation, however,
when several supervisors distributed such emblems among the workers. Id.
100. It bears emphasis that management has. many effective campaign tactics at its disposal,
including the right to campaign among the employees during the workday, the ability to hold
"captive audience" speeches, and the power (with rare exceptions) to exclude non-employee union
organizers from company premises. For an insightful critique of these advantages, see Becker, supra
note 1.
101. This conviction that people should not be compelled to bear messages they may find
objectionable is obviously not limited to the workplace. In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977), for example, the Supreme Court ruled that a state could not force motorists to display a
motto on their license plates that the motorists found morally and religiously offensive. As the
Court concluded, "[t]he First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view
different from the majority and to refuse to foster . . . an idea they find morally objectionable."
Id. at 715; see also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(invalidating state law that all students salute the flag on the grounds that "no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein").
This is not to argue, of course, that the First Amendment forbids employers from pressuring
employees to wear antiunion insignia. The First Amendment applies only to speech regulated by
the government and is therefore inapposite to private employers. Nonetheless, we should protect
this freedom of conscience regardless of whether the compulsion emanates from a tyrannical
government or a tyrannical boss. Indeed, it has been argued that "[tihe exercise of . . . managerial
authority is closer, more regular, and often more salient to the worker than is the exercise of
government authority." PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 143 (1990). For .this reason,
employees should not have to face either explicit or implied pressure to accept antiunion insignia.
102. See, e.g., Singer Co., 199 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1205-06 (1972), enforced, 480 F.2d 269 (10th Cir.
1973), discussed supra at note 40.
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